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NOTE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY V. REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA: THE SUPREME COURT’S
DISINTEREST IN RELIANCE INTERESTS
RACHAEL E. SAVAGE *
“Anywhere we are planted we are capable of blooming.” 1
Abigail was born in Jamaica. 2 She lived in a clapboard house without
access to clean water, let alone opportunity. 3 She was sent to the United
States just before her twelfth birthday. 4 The neighborhood she was brought
to was not the America she had envisioned: it was dangerous and overrun
with gangs. 5 Despite the challenges of growing up in such a neighborhood,
Abigail excelled socially and academically. 6 But even with these successes,
she faced a major obstacle: she was brought to this country without the proper
documents. 7 When she learned that she was undocumented, Abigail felt
ashamed and feared being discovered.8 “I felt like a criminal,” she
remembers. 9
In 2012, Abigail’s world changed. 10 President Obama’s Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a memorandum entitled “Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
© 2021 Rachael E. Savage
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author would like to thank Professor Rena Steinzor for her unwavering support and guidance
throughout the writing process. She also wishes to thank her parents Lisa and David, siblings
Victoria and Jonathan, and partner Arjun for their consistent patience and encouragement. Lastly,
she would like to thank her Maryland Law Review colleagues for their thoughtful feedback and
dedication.
1. Abigail, Anywhere We Are Planted We Are Capable of Blooming, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR.
(Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.nilc.org/2018/02/21/anywhere-planted-capable-of-blooming/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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States as Children.” 11 The memorandum outlined new priorities under which
DHS should choose to exercise prosecutorial discretion and grant deferred
action when dealing with certain individuals who were brought to this
country as children. 12 The program became known as Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, 13 and was popular with a majority of
Americans. 14 Abigail and about 800,000 similarly-situated individuals 15
qualified for an exercise of discretion under DACA. 16 As part of the DACA
program, Abigail could get her driver’s license and work legally—she had a
future here. 17 Abigail went on to earn her bachelor’s and master’s degrees. 18
She got a job working at a local nonprofit that served vulnerable
individuals. 19 She supported and positively contributed to her community. 20
Then, in 2017, President Trump’s DHS issued a memorandum ending the
DACA program, 21 and with it, Abigail’s security.
In Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California, 22 the Supreme Court addressed DHS’s attempt to rescind the
DACA immigration program. 23 The Court held that DHS’s rescission of
DACA was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of Section 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).24 The Court correctly relied on
faults in DHS’s reasoning to render the program’s rescission invalid, but the
11. Janet Napolitano, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who
Came to the United States as Children, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (June 15, 2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-cameto-us-as-children.pdf [hereinafter DACA Memo].
12. Id.
13. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Feb. 1,
2021), https://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca.
14. A 2012 poll found that fifty seven percent of Americans supported the DACA program.
New Poll: Obama’s New DREAMer Deferred Action Policy Popular, Pragmatic, AMERICA’S
VOICE (Nov. 13, 2012), https://americasvoice.org/press_releases/new-poll-obamas-new-dreamerdeferred-action-policy-popular-pragmatic/. Nearly a decade later, a 2021 poll found that seventy
two percent of Americans supported the program. Nicole Narea, Poll: Most Americans Support a
Path to Citizenship for Undocumented Immigrants, VOX (Feb. 4, 2021, 8:30 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2021/2/4/22264074/poll-undocumented-immigrantscitizenship-stimulus-biden.
15. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL
(Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/deferred-action-childhoodarrivals-daca-overview.
16. Abigail, supra note 1.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 13.
22. 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
23. Id. at 1901–02.
24. Id. at 1915.
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Court failed to meaningfully address the many reliance interests at stake in
the case. 25
Weighing reliance interests is an important and necessary process courts
must undertake to determine whether agency action is arbitrary or
capricious. 26 Considering the impact of agency action on those who rely on
prior agency policy is well-settled precedent, especially when those impacts
are pecuniary or affect regulated industries. 27 Reliance interests must be
considered not just when industries rely to their detriment, but also when
individuals rely to their detriment.28 This consideration is especially
important when those individuals’ interests also implicate pecuniary
interests. 29 In neglecting to weigh the reliance interests at stake in DACA’s

25. See id. at 1914 (dismissing the respondents’ concerns about DACA recipients’ reliance
interests as “not necessarily dispositive”). The reliance interests of DACA recipients played a major
role in opposition to the attempted rescission. Brief for Respondent at 6–7, 41, Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (Nos. 18-587; 18-588; 18-589)
[hereinafter Brief for Regents]. The respondents argued that DHS should have considered DACA
recipients’ reliance interests but did not. Id. Multiple briefs filed in support of the respondents also
highlighted the importance of their reliance interests. See, e.g., Brief for Alianza Americas et al. at
7–8, 13, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (Nos. 18587; 18-588; 18-589) [hereinafter Brief for Alianza Americas] (highlighting the “major life
decisions” the DACA policy incentivized); Brief for Ass’n of Am. Med. Coll. et al at 6–8, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (Nos. 18-587; 18-588; 18589) [hereinafter Brief for Association of American Medical Colleges] (highlighting the “significant,
long-term investments” the DACA policy incentivized); Brief for Nat’l Educ. Ass’n & Nat’l PTA
at 5–29, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (Nos. 18587; 18-588; 18-589) [hereinafter Brief for National Education Association] (highlighting the
numerous contributions DACA recipients make to the American education system and the
consequences of rescinding the program).
26. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); see also infra
notes 105–120 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 112–117 and accompanying text for examples of cases in which the
Supreme Court found relevant the pecuniary interests of industries that relied to their detriment on
prior agency policies.
28. See infra Section IV.B (explaining that reliance interests are relevant in every instance of
judicial review of agency action under APA § 706).
29. See infra notes 262, 265, 269, 271, 282 and accompanying text for examples of these
pecuniary interests. As is discussed more fully below in Section IV.B, DACA recipients make
substantial contributions to the United States economy. Nicole Prchal Svajlenka & Philip E.
Wolgin, What We Know About the Demographic and Economic Impacts of DACA Recipients:
Spring 2020 Edition, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 6, 2020, 9:01AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2020/04/06/482676/knowdemographic-economic-impacts-daca-recipients-spring-2020-edition/. They pay more than $8.5
billion in federal, state, and local taxes each year. Id. DACA recipients also help fund Social
Security and Medicare through their payroll tax contributions. Id. In addition to tax contributions,
DACA recipients have nearly $25 billion in spending power to use in their communities. Id. They
also own more than 56,000 homes across the United States and make more than $565 million in
mortgage payments annually. Id. The Supreme Court should have taken these contributions into
account when determining the legality of the DACA rescission. See infra Section IV.B.
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rescission, the Court, contrary to its own long-established precedent, “failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem.” 30
I. THE CASE
In Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California, the Supreme Court decided three cases 31 resulting from
challenges to the Trump Administration’s attempted rescission of the DACA
program. 32 The DACA program allows specified noncitizens who entered
the United States as children, a group known as “Dreamers,” 33 to apply for a
two-year deferral of removal. 34 In June of 2012, the Obama-era DHS enacted
the DACA program by memorandum. 35 In November of 2014, DHS issued
a second memorandum that expanded DACA eligibility and created the

30. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see
infra Section IV.B.
31. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018),
vacated in part and rev’d in part, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209
(D.D.C. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct.
1891 (2020); Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), vacated in part, aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891
(2020).
32. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901–02.
33. “Dreamers” get their name from the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors
(“DREAM”) Act. The Dream Act: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 16, 2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/dream-act-overview.
The Act would
provide certain children who came to the country illegally with a pathway to legal status. Id. Since
its first introduction to Congress in 2001, the DREAM Act or versions of it have been introduced
more than ten times. Id. Despite bipartisan support for each version of the Act, no version has
become law. Id.
34. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901–02.
35. Id. at 1901. The DACA memorandum concluded that noncitizens who meet certain criteria
“warrant favorable treatment under the immigration laws” and instructs Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) officials to use prosecutorial discretion to defer removal action for a period
of two years. Id. at 1901–02. To qualify for DACA, individuals must have been under the age of
thirty-one in 2012; have resided in the United States since 2007; be either current students, or have
completed high school, or be honorably discharged veterans; not have been convicted of serious
crimes; and not threaten national security. Id. at 1901. The DACA memorandum also directed ICE
to consider DACA recipients for work authorization. Id. at 1901–02. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §
1.3(a)(4)(vi) and 42 C.F.R. § 417.422(h), recipients of deferred action are eligible to receive Social
Security and Medicare benefits. Id. More than 700,000 individuals were eligible for DACA at its
inception. Id. More than 1.3 million individuals are eligible today. Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) Data Tools, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Dec. 31, 2020),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-dacaprofiles.
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Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(“DAPA”) 36 program. 37
Before the DAPA memorandum’s implementation, Texas and twentyfive other states sued in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas. 38 The states alleged that the DAPA memorandum breached
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the APA’s notice-andcomment requirement, and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. 39 The
district court found the states likely to succeed on the merits of at least one
of their claims and entered a preliminary injunction against the DAPA
memorandum’s implementation. 40
In 2015, a split panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the injunction. 41 It found that the states were likely to
succeed on their APA claim and that DAPA was “manifestly contrary” to the
carefully crafted scheme of the INA. 42 The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in “an equally divided Court.” 43 Litigation over the DAPA
memorandum and its expansion of the DACA program continued in Texas,
but the programs remained enjoined. 44
In June of 2017, DHS rescinded the DAPA memorandum. 45 That
September, Attorney General Jeff Sessions advised Acting Secretary of
Homeland Security Elaine Duke that DHS should also rescind the DACA
36. The DAPA program authorized deferred action for parents whose children legally were in
the country, either as citizens or lawful permanent residents. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1902. At the
time, the program would have made more than 4 million individuals eligible for deferred action and
associated benefits. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1901–02 (citing Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015)).
41. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015). In Texas, the government argued
that the DAPA memorandum was based on prosecutorial discretion because ‘“lawful presence’ is
not [] status,” so DHS could revoke or alter the parameters of lawful presence at any time. Id. at
167. If DHS’s actions were based on prosecutorial discretion, those actions would be unreviewable
because decisions whether to prosecute are left entirely to agency officials and courts may not
interfere with such decisions. Id. The Fifth Circuit majority disagreed, reasoning that DAPA was
reviewable because the program would confer lawful presence and benefits on a certain class of
noncitizens and was “much more than nonenforcement.” Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1902 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
42. Id. (quoting Texas, 809 F.3d at 179–81 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Fifth
Circuit also rejected the federal government’s claims that DACA was an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, citing the benefits DACA recipients could receive if they were granted deferrals. Id. at
1920 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
43. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam).
44. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1903.
45. Id. The Trump Administration DHS cited DAPA never taking effect, the injunction and
Texas litigation, and the Administration’s new immigration enforcement priorities as reasons for
the rescission. Id.
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memorandum because it “shared the ‘same legal . . . defects that the courts
recognized as to DAPA’ and was ‘likely’ to meet a similar fate.” 46 Secretary
Duke issued a decision memorandum explaining that DACA would be
terminated and specified the process by which the program would be “wound
down.” 47
Plaintiffs, ranging from individuals to advocacy groups, challenged
Secretary Duke’s decision in California, 48 New York, 49 and District of
Columbia federal district courts.50 Plaintiffs claimed “the rescission was
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA and that it infringed the equal
protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”51 All
three district courts ultimately found for the plaintiffs. 52 The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia held that Secretary Duke’s
“conclusory statements were insufficient to explain” the DACA rescission. 53
The court stayed its order to permit DHS to reissue its memorandum
terminating DACA so that DHS could provide a “fuller explanation” for its
rescission. 54

46. Id.
47. Id. The “wind-down of the program” was effective immediately. Elaine C. Duke,
Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescissiondaca [hereinafter Duke Memo]. Secretary Duke’s memorandum advised that no new DACA
applications would be accepted. Id. DHS could, on “an individual, case-by-case basis,” review
applications for two-year renewals from DACA recipients whose benefits would expire within six
months of the memorandum. Id. For all other recipients, previously issued deferred action
determinations and work authorizations would not be revoked but would expire at the end of their
validity periods with no prospect for renewal. Id.
48. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304 (N.D. Cal.
2018).
49. Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
50. NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. 2018).
51. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1903.
52. Id. All three courts rejected the government’s arguments that the claims were unreviewable
based on the APA and that the courts lacked jurisdiction under the INA. Id. at 1903–04. The
Regents and Vidal courts also held that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged equal protection claims
and proceeded to enter “coextensive nationwide preliminary injunctions.” Id. at 1904. Immigrants’
rights organization Casa de Maryland also challenged the DACA rescission. Id. at 1903 n.2. In a
memorandum opinion, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted partial
summary judgment to the government despite lamenting its holding. Casa de Md. v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758, 779 (D. Md. 2018) (“This Court does not like the outcome of
this case.”). After the government filed petitions for certiorari in Regents, Vidal, and NAACP, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and found
the Secretary’s rescission arbitrary and capricious, therefore in violation of the APA. Casa de Md.
v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 924 F.3d 684, 706 (4th Cir. 2019). The Fourth Circuit stayed its mandate
after the Supreme Court took up Regents, Vidal, and NAACP. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1903 n.2.
53. NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 243–45 (deferring ruling on the equal protection ground but
granting partial summary judgment to plaintiffs on the APA claim).
54. Id. at 245.
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Secretary Duke’s successor, Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, responded via
memorandum two months later by ‘“declin[ing] to disturb’ the rescission.” 55
She purported to clarify Secretary Duke’s memorandum by identifying three
reasons for rescinding DACA. 56 The government petitioned the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia to revise its order based on Secretary
Nielsen’s memorandum, but the court declined. 57 The court reasoned that
the Nielsen memorandum ‘“fail[ed] to elaborate meaningfully’ on the
agency’s illegality rationale” and “still did not provide an adequate
explanation” for the rescission. 58 The government appealed the decision. 59
After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction the district court ordered in
Regents, 60 but before the other federal circuits decided, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and consolidated all of the cases for argument. 61
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Agency action is subject to judicial review under the APA 62 where no
organic statute governs the action and where the action is not committed to
agency discretion. 63 The APA’s framework “sets forth the procedures by
which federal agencies are accountable to the public and their actions subject

55. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1904 (quoting Application to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (No. 18-587), p. 121a).
56. Id. Secretary Nielsen cited the Attorney General’s conclusion that DACA was unlawful,
DHS’s doubts about DACA’s legality, and the Trump Administration’s new policy priorities. Id.
Specifically, Secretary Nielsen outlined the following Trump Administration priorities: “any classbased immigration relief should come from Congress . . . ; DHS’s preference for exercising
prosecutorial discretion on ‘a truly individualized, case-by-case basis’; and [] the importance of
‘project[ing] a message’ that immigration laws would be enforced . . . .” Id. (quoting Application
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S.
Ct. 1891 (2020) (No.18-587), pp. 123a–24a) (alteration in original).
57. Id. at 1904–05 (quoting NAACP, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 460, 473–74).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1905.
60. 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018).
61. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1905.
62. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–96.
63. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a); Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S.
340, 345 (1984); see, e.g., Drake v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 291 F.3d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding
that judicial review of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) action under the APA was
unavailable as the FAA’s actions were already regulated by an organic statute). The Supreme Court
has recognized a “strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative
action.” Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam. Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986). This presumption
of judicial review is embodied in the APA. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–
96. Where judicial review is permitted, the APA lays out courts’ scope of review, which determines
how and by which legal standards courts may review agency action. See, e.g., Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (outlining the standards by which courts may review agency action);
id. § 553 (outlining the standards by which courts may review agencies’ compliance with procedural
requirements).
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to review by the courts.” 64 The APA requires agencies’ decision-making to
be “reasoned” 65 and demands that “arbitrary” or “capricious” decisions be
“set aside.” 66 The standard of review is “narrow,” meaning courts are not to
“substitute [their] judgment for that of the agency.” 67 Instead, courts must
determine only whether the decision was “based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” 68
Section II.A describes the function of the APA as a check on agency power. 69
Section II.B discusses the parameters for judicial review of agency action
under the APA. 70 Section II.C details the process of rescinding agency
actions pursuant to the APA, specifically addressing the arbitrary and
capricious standard and remedies for violations of that standard. 71
A. The Administrative Procedure Act as a Check on Agency Power
The APA outlines the procedures used to hold federal agencies
accountable to both the general public and the judiciary. 72 The procedures
laid out in the APA serve two main purposes: (1) promoting “agency
accountability” 73 and (2) instilling “confidence” 74 in agency decisions. 75 The
APA requires agencies to articulate “reasoned analysis” for the
implementation of policies 76 and ensures that “interested persons” have an
opportunity to fully respond to these reasons before the policy’s

64. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
65. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015) (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc.
v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
67. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
68. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
69. See infra Section II.A.
70. See infra Section II.B.
71. See infra Section II.C.
72. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
73. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 643 (1986).
74. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1909 (2020).
75. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012) (describing how
the requirements of the APA help mitigate possible appearances of agency impropriety). The APA
promotes agency accountability by requiring agencies to present proposed regulations to the public
and by requiring the final regulations to be “logical outgrowths” of the initially proposed
regulations. See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin.,
626 F.3d 84, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding regulations neither arbitrary nor capricious where
they were logical outgrowths of the initial proposal and where interested parties had sufficient notice
of the regulations and opportunity to comment on them). The APA also serves as a “check upon
administrators,” ensuring accountability. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644
(1950).
76. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
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promulgation. 77 This process promotes agency accountability insofar as it
provides a public check on agencies’ authority to promulgate regulations. 78
These procedures also instill confidence in agency decisions by ensuring that
the reasons provided are not retroactive “convenient litigating position[s],”
but rather the true goals of the agency. 79
B. Reviewability of Agency Action under the APA
The APA articulates the framework for judicial review of agency
action. 80 Section 706 of the APA governs the scope of that standard of
review. 81 Specifically, Section 706(2)(A) provides that decisions deemed
“arbitrary” or “capricious” will be “set aside.” 82 This standard of review is
“narrow.” 83 This standard is narrow because when courts are determining
whether agency action is “arbitrary” or “capricious,” their analysis is limited
to the reasons the agency provided at the time of the initial action and the
information the agency relied on at the time of that action. 84 In reviewing
whether a decision is arbitrary or capricious, courts are “not to substitute
[their] judgment for that of the agency.” 85 Review by the courts should assess
only whether the decision was “based on consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” 86 The presumption of
judicial review applies unless a statute precludes such relief or the action is
committed by law to agency discretion. 87

77. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (“After notice required by this
section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
presentation.”).
78. See generally id. §§ 500–96 (outlining the regulations by which agencies must abide).
79. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
213 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
80. Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (stating the APA “embodies the basic
presumption of judicial review to one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action.’” (quoting
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702)).
81. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706.
82. Id. § 706(2)(A). Compare P.R. Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir. 1993) (setting
aside the agency’s decision as arbitrary and capricious where there were no “legitimate reasons” for
the decision), with FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529–30 (2009) (declining to
set aside the agency’s decision as arbitrary and capricious where there was a reasonable rationale
for the decision).
83. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 513 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (describing the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 513–14.
85. Id. at 513 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
87. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).
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1. Action Committed to Agency Discretion Is Reviewed Narrowly
According to Section 701(a) of the APA, federal agency decisions are
reviewable unless a statute precludes review or the agency has complete
discretion over the action. 88 Courts have read the exception relating to
agency discretion in Section 701(a)(2) “quite narrowly” to “honor the
presumption of review.” 89 The exception has been historically confined to
“administrative decision[s] traditionally left to agency discretion.” 90 The
category of decisions not subject to judicial review includes agencies’
choices not to pursue enforcement of their regulations, 91 as such choices are
“committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.” 92
C. Rescinding Agency Action under the APA
According to Section 706 of the APA, a judicially reviewable agency
action may be rescinded if that action is considered to be “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 93
Under this standard of review, courts must consider only whether the
agency’s action was based on a full “consideration of the relevant factors” 94
or whether there exists a “clear error of judgment.” 95 An agency must
“articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action” 96 that includes a “rational

88. Id.
89. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018); see Lincoln
v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) (explaining that the exceptions in Section 701(a)(2) are restricted
to “those rare circumstances where the relevant statute ‘is drawn so that a court would have no
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion’” (quoting Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)).
90. Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 191; see Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270,
282 (1987) (holding Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review of administrative decisions
“traditionally” committed to agency discretion (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599, 601 (1988) (holding Section 701(a)(2)
precludes judicial review in an area of executive action where courts rarely intervene out of
“extraordinary deference”); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 818–19 (1992) (holding
Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review in areas where “courts have long been hesitant to
intrude”).
91. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831. In Heckler, the Court held that the Food and Drug
Administration’s denial of a petition to prevent certain drugs for lethal injection was unreviewable
as there was a “tradition” of committing to “an agency’s absolute discretion.” Id. Therefore, the
decision to enforce or not enforce its policies was left up to the agency. Id. at 837. The Court
identified a number of factors that corroborated its decision, including that “when an agency refuses
to act” there is no action for courts to review. Id. at 832.
92. Id. at 831.
93. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706.
94. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
95. Indep. Meat Packers Ass’n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 238 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 966 (1976).
96. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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connection between the facts found and the choice made.” 97 Courts are
prohibited from substituting their judgments for agency judgments. 98
However, courts may “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the
agency’s path may be reasonably discerned.” 99
1. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
Agencies must adequately explain their actions to avoid arbitrary or
capricious decisions that violate Section 706 of the APA. 100 It is a
“foundational principle of administrative law” that courts “may uphold
agency action only on the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the
action.” 101 Thus, judicial review of agency action is limited to the original
reasons set forth by the agency upon implementation of its action. 102 Courts
may find these original reasons to be flawed if:
[T]he agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended
it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise. 103
Courts also find agency action arbitrary or capricious if the agency
“does not take account of legitimate reliance” by the public on the status quo
before the agency’s action. 104

97. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). The Supreme
Court requires agencies to “make findings that support [their] decision[s]” and mandates that those
findings be “supported by substantial evidence.” Id.
98. Id. at 168–69.
99. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284, 286, 290
(1974) (finding the Interstate Commerce Commission’s decision neither arbitrary nor capricious
where there was “substantial evidence” that allowed the Court to “discern” the path the agency took
to justify its rule); see also Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 581, 595
(1945) (finding the reasoning behind the Federal Power Commission’s decision neither arbitrary
nor capricious where “the path which it followed [could] be discerned”).
100. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1000 (2005)
(holding when agencies seek to change previously implemented rules, they must adequately address
the basis for that change with a “reasoned explanation”).
101. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 758 (2015) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318
U.S. 80 (1943)).
102. Id.
103. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
104. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996); see United States v. Pa. Indus.
Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674–75 (1973) (noting the importance of reliance in arbitrary and
capricious analysis).
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a. Relevance of Reliance Interests
The Supreme Court dictates that an agency must “be cognizant” of
whether it induced a party to rely to its detriment on the agency’s policy or
policies. 105 The Court has held that “it would be arbitrary or capricious to
ignore” any “serious reliance interests” that agencies’ prior policies
incentivized. 106 Accordingly, agencies must provide “more detailed
justification[s]” for their decisions when they decide to rescind or reverse
previously implemented policies that “ha[ve] engendered serious reliance
interests.” 107 Agencies need not show that a new policy is preferable to the
existing policy it replaces unless that new policy (1) rests on factual findings
that contradict the agency’s previous findings or (2) poses a harm to those
who relied on the existing policy. 108
Supreme Court precedent not only requires agencies to weigh reliance
interests when taking new action, but it also requires courts to weigh them
when they review previous agency action. 109 The Court declines to defer to
an agency’s interpretation of its decision in cases where it determines that
serious reliance interests are threatened. 110 While the term “serious” in the
context of reliance interests is left undefined, the Court tends to consider
industry or pecuniary reliance interests “serious” enough to weigh. 111 For
105. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016).
106. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). The Court has yet to
directly define “serious” in the context of reliance interests but has found agency action arbitrary
and capricious where industry and pecuniary interests are at stake. See, e.g., infra notes 112–116;
see also Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC, 921 F.3d 1102, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding agency action
was arbitrary and capricious when it departed from a prior nonenforcement policy because it
“fail[ed] to consider . . . the reliance interests” of regulated parties and others). While National
Lifeline Association was a decision from the District Court for the District of Columbia rather than
the Supreme Court, the district court relied on Supreme Court precedent in its analysis of reliance
interests. Id.
107. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515. While the Fox majority noted the importance of
weighing reliance interests, it did not focus its analysis on Fox’s reliance on prior FCC policy in the
opinion. Id. Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence in part and concurrence in the judgment, also
contended that reliance interests “have weight” in APA analysis, but did not go so far as to weigh
those interests. Id. at 536 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and concurring in part).
108. Id. at 515.
109. See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 159 (2012) (addressing
the agency’s failure to meaningfully consider reliance interests then proceeding to weigh those
interests to determine the validity of the agency’s action).
110. See id. at 158 (declining to defer to the Department of Labor’s new policy interpretation in
part because the “agency’s announcement of its interpretation [was] preceded by a very lengthy
period of conspicuous inaction” on which the pharmaceutical industry reasonably relied); Kisor v.
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2421 (2019) (noting that courts should not defer to an agency interpretation
that “creates unfair surprise or upsets reliance interests”); Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S.
597, 613–14 (2013) (reiterating that agency interpretations that upset reliance interests may lose
their deferential weight).
111. See infra notes 112–116 (providing examples of instances where the Court has considered
pecuniary interests significant).
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example, the Court has considered the reliance interests of the
pharmaceutical industry, 112 car dealerships, 113 mortgage bankers, 114
purchasing departments of aerospace companies, 115 and out-of-state
customers of credit card companies serious enough to weigh. 116 While the
Court does not always find the industry reliance detrimental enough to
rescind the agency action, it still weighs those interests. 117
Challengers alleging detrimental reliance on prior agency policies must
“specifically identif[y]” the harm or potential harm to their interest,
demonstrate that the harm was “reasonably incurred,” and “causally tie[]” the
harm to the agency action. 118 As noted above, relevant harms have
traditionally been pecuniary. 119 Where challengers can prove that they
reasonably relied to their detriment on a previous agency interpretation of its
regulation, courts will hold the new regulation invalid. 120
112. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 158 (declining to defer to the agency’s new interpretation of its
regulation because the interpretation was directly contrary to long-standing pharmaceutical industry
practice and thus would unfairly burden employers).
113. Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2126 (declining to defer to the agency’s most recently promulgated
regulation because the car dealership industry had relied on the agency’s previous regulation to
negotiate and structure employee compensation plans).
114. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n., 575 U.S. 92, 106 (2015) (reiterating the importance of
weighing whether the “prior policy ha[d] engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken
into account” but not finding those reliance interests serious enough to rescind the Department of
Labor’s new policy (quoting Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515)).
115. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (noting the
importance of weighing “[t]he possible reliance of [the aerospace] industry on the [National Labor
Relations] Board’s past decisions with respect to buyers”).
116. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (noting the importance of
weighing credit card holders’ “legitimate reliance on prior interpretation”).
117. See, e.g., Perez, 575 U.S. at 106 (finding agency action permissible despite real estate
finance companies’ reliance on prior policy regarding mortgage loan officers’ exemption from
minimum wage requirements).
118. Solenex LLC v. Bernhardt, 962 F.3d 520, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2020). In Paralyzed Veterans of
America v. D.C. Arena L.P., the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit contended
that parties must prove that they relied on prior agency policy to trigger an arbitrary and capricious
determination. 117 F.3d 579, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The strict rule in Paralyzed Veterans was
ultimately overruled by the Supreme Court in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, but the
majority still considered the reliance interests in that case. Perez, 575 U.S. at 106.
119. For example, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, the Supreme Court considered the reliance
interests of the Bell Aerospace company in the context of whether there were “fines or damages”
incurred due to a change in prior policy. 416 U.S. at 295. The Court considered similar fines-based
reliance interests in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 556 U.S. 502, 506 (2009).
120. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (invalidating the
agency’s new regulation where “decades of industry reliance” were at issue); Bell Aerospace, 416
U.S. at 295 (upholding the agency’s new interpretation where petitioners had not shown “adverse
consequences ensuing” from their reliance); Alaska Pro. Hunters Ass’n v. Fed. Aviation Admin.,
177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invalidating agency interpretation that upset thirty years of
reliance on contradictory advice from local agency officials); Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 587
(upholding the agency’s new interpretation where petitioners had not “reasonably relied to their
detriment” on the agency’s previous interpretation).
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2. Judicial Review of Agency Action
Judicial review of agency action is limited to “the grounds on which the
agency acted.” 121 Rather than striking a proposed action entirely, “remanding
[the action] to the agency . . . is the preferred course.” 122 If a court finds the
grounds the agency acted on to be inadequate, the court can remand the case
for the agency to either provide “a fuller explanation” of the reasoning the
agency employed “at the time of the agency action” 123 or “deal with the
problem afresh” by taking new action that includes new or better-articulated
reasons. 124 A fuller articulation or new action is required because allowing
agencies to invoke belated, unrelated justifications for their actions upsets
“the orderly functioning of the process of review.” 125
a. Remedying by Providing a Fuller Explanation
When an agency decides to provide a fuller explanation for the
reasoning it employed at the time it took the action, it may not provide new
reasons for its action, but instead must better articulate its original reasons. 126
The Court has held that agencies must “cogently explain” their decisions. 127
Lower courts have permitted agencies to provide “amplified
articulation[s]” 128 of prior “conclusory” reasons. 129 Notably, agencies are not
permitted to engage in “post hoc rationalizations” of their actions; these
“cannot serve as sufficient predicate” for their actions.130
121. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 760 (2015).
122. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990).
123. Id.
124. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201 (1947).
125. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
126. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142–43 (1973) (per curiam).
127. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 48 (1983).
An agency does not explain “cogently” when it relies “on factors which Congress has not intended
it to consider,” neglects to consider an important aspect of the problem, offers “an explanation for
its decision that runs counter to the evidence,” or uses reasoning “so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Id. at 43. Additionally, an
agency’s decision is cogently explained when it does not rely on post hoc rationalizations of its
reasoning. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971). Post hoc
rationalizations are impermissible whether they come from agencies, agency attorneys, or reviewing
courts. Id.; Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94.
128. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 546 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
129. Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting A.L. Pharma, Inc. v.
Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). In Alpharma, the district court held that the reasons
the Food and Drug Administration supplied on remand after a challenge to its initial decision were
not post hoc rationalizations because they expanded on the agency’s original reasons, and thus were
sufficient to justify its position. Id. at 6–7 (citing Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 546 F.2d at 992).
130. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 539 (1981); see Overton Park, 401
U.S. at 419 (rejecting litigation affidavits from agency officials as impermissible post hoc
rationalizations of inadequate agency reasons).

2021]

DISINTEREST IN RELIANCE INTERESTS

127

b. Remedying by Taking New Action
An agency may respond to a challenge to its action by rescinding the
initial action and taking new action premised on novel or different
reasoning. 131 Thus when an agency decides to take new action to implement
a challenged policy, it is not limited by the reasons it articulated in its initial
action. 132 The agency may supply entirely different reasons than those upon
which it originally relied, provided the agency complies with the procedural
requirements for agency action.133 Requiring a new agency decision before
permitting new justifications is more than just “an idle and useless
formality.” 134 This requirement ensures “agency accountability” by forcing
agencies to properly justify their exercises of authority. 135
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
Writing for a five justice majority, Chief Justice Roberts first clarified
that “all parties agree[d]” that DHS could rescind the program, therefore that
issue was not at stake. 136 The majority identified three issues that were at
stake in the DACA rescission: (1) whether the APA claims were reviewable,
(2) whether the rescission was arbitrary and capricious, and (3) whether the
respondents put forth a viable equal protection claim. 137 The majority found
the claims to be reviewable and the rescission to be arbitrary and capricious
in violation of the APA, but did not find the respondents’ equal protection
claims viable. 138
The majority held that the claims were reviewable under the APA. 139
The Court determined that the DACA memorandum was more than just “a
passive non-enforcement policy.” 140 Deferral constituted a series of

131. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947).
132. See generally id. (upholding new action taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) on a previously litigated issue because the novel reasons the agency employed in the second
action were based on substantial evidence, consistent with the SEC’s authority, and clearly
articulated).
133. Id.; see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764–65 (1969) (holding the
NLRB’s action invalid for failure to comply with procedural requirements, but allowing the action
based on subsequent properly-enacted adjudications).
134. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. at 766 n.6 (holding that remanding on account of improper
implementation procedure would be “an idle and useless formality”).
135. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 643 (1986).
136. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905 (2020).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1915 (“None of these points, either singly or in concert, establishes a plausible equal
protection claim.”)
139. Id. at 1905.
140. A “passive non-enforcement policy” would be unreviewable as an expression of agency
discretion. Id. at 1905–06.
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individualized adjudications, and DACA conferred benefits in addition to
simply deferring removal. 141
After finding the claims to be reviewable,142 the majority held that the
rescission was arbitrary and capricious. 143 To rescind DACA, the APA
required DHS to either explain its reasons at the time of the initial rescission
in more detail or take new action rescinding the program. 144 Secretary
Nielsen opted to further explain the decision rather than take new action. 145
The majority found that her explanation was inadequate because her reasons
neither matched nor elaborated on Secretary Duke’s reasons.146 The majority
held that the decision to rescind DACA was arbitrary and capricious because
Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum “failed to consider . . . important aspect[s]
of the problem,” including alternatives to achieving the Trump
Administration’s policy goals and the reliance interests of DACA
recipients. 147
The majority also held that the respondents had not adequately stated an
equal protection claim because they did not raise “a plausible inference that
the rescission was motivated by animus.” 148 The majority determined that
the “disparate impact of the rescission” on Latinx immigrants from Mexico,
the “unusual history” of the rescission, and President Trump’s statements on
immigration—even taken together—could not establish a plausible equal
protection claim. 149 They found nothing presented by the respondents to be
credibly indicative of animus: Mexican immigrants would be expected to
141. Id.
142. The majority also determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the claims despite the
government’s argument that provisions in the INA were independent bars to review. Id. at 1907.
The majority found the provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) and 1252(g) to be narrow, holding that
the rescission “is not a decision to ‘commence proceedings’” or “to ‘adjudicate’ a case or ‘execute’
a removal order.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)).
143. Id. at 1915.
144. Id. at 1908.
145. Id. at 1908–10.
146. Id. The majority found that Secretary Nielsen’s reasoning bore “little relationship” to
Secretary Duke’s reasoning. Id. at 1908. Because Secretary Nielsen was limited to DHS’s original
reasons, her memorandum failed to satisfy the explanation requirement. Id. The majority also
determined that the timing of the Nielsen memorandum was problematic, as the APA requires
“contemporaneous explanations.” Id. at 1908–09.
147. Id. at 1910–15 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). Specifically, the majority quoted Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., holding that “when an agency rescinds a prior policy its
reasoned analysis must consider the ‘alternative[s]’ that are ‘within the ambit of the existing
[policy].’” Id. at 1913 (alteration in original). Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum did not consider
forbearance at all––not even in the context of maintaining the forbearance policy without the
attendant benefits as an alternative to rescission. Id. The Court also contended that Secretary
Duke’s memorandum failed to consider any reliance interests of DACA recipients. Id. at 1914.
148. Id. at 1916.
149. Id. at 1915.
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make up a large share of those affected as they make up a large share of
immigrants, the history of DACA’s rescission was not irregular because
agencies often rescind prior actions, and President Trump’s inflammatory
statements were too “remote in time” and made in contexts too “unrelated”
to be considered in the animus calculation. 150
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in
part. 151 She agreed with the majority on the issues of reviewability and
arbitrary and capriciousness, but disagreed on the issue of equal protection. 152
Justice Sotomayor would have permitted respondents’ equal protection
claims to proceed on remand because each complaint “set forth particularized
facts that plausibly allege[d] discriminatory animus.” 153 Justice Sotomayor
emphasized the relevance and weight of the respondents’ three “factors” 154
of discrimination and chastised the majority for “bypassing context.” 155
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito and Justice Gorsuch, concurred
in the judgment in part and dissented in part. 156 The Justices agreed with the
majority on the issue of equal protection but disagreed on the issues of
reviewability and arbitrary and capriciousness. 157 Justice Thomas took a
“two wrongs make a right” approach: DACA was implemented “unilaterally”
and by “mere memorandum,” so it could be rescinded the same way. 158 He
reiterated that DACA was “unlawful from its inception” 159 and argued that
“[s]o long as the agency’s determination of illegality is sound, our review
should be at an end.” 160 He also cited the “perverse incentives” 161 created by
the majority’s decision, asserting that the majority’s decision would make it
150. Id. at 1915–16. For a discussion on the Supreme Court’s inconsistent willingness to
consider political statements in equal protection analysis, see Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York v. Cuomo. 141 S. Ct. 63, 80 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (per curiam) (noting that the Court considered important Governor Cuomo’s comments
on religion in the context of COVID-19 restrictions but did not consider important then-President
Trump’s comments on religion in the context of immigration restrictions in Trump v. Hawaii).
151. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1917 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment,
and dissenting in part).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1915 (majority opinion).
155. Id. at 1918 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting
in part).
156. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1919. Justice Thomas cited the INA’s “elaborate statutory scheme” as a reason DHS
had “no discretion to create an additional class” of noncitizens eligible for lawful presence. Id. at
1923.
160. Id. at 1919. Justice Thomas determined that “[t]he decision to rescind an unlawful agency
action is per se lawful,” thus DACA’s rescission—no matter the form—was appropriate. Id. at
1922.
161. Id. at 1919.
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more difficult for future administrations to undo illegal actions by their
predecessors. 162 Ultimately, Justice Thomas also found that “DHS did
provide a sufficient explanation for its action” by citing the Attorney
General’s determination of DACA’s illegality. 163
Justice Alito also concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in
part. 164 He argued that the Court did “not resolve the question of DACA’s
rescission,” but rather told DHS “to go back and try [to rescind the program]
again.” 165 Justice Alito agreed with Justice Thomas’s points regarding
DACA’s unlawfulness and DHS’s adequate explanation of rescission. 166 He
took issue with the fact that DACA’s rescission was prevented for the whole
of President Trump’s term in office. 167
Justice Kavanaugh, too, concurred in the judgment in part and dissented
in part, arguing that DHS had offered sufficient explanation for DACA’s
rescission in Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum, and that her memorandum
was not an impermissible post hoc rationalization of agency action. 168 He
asserted that the post hoc rationalization prohibition applied to agency
lawyers or reviewing judges, but not necessarily agency decisionmakers
themselves. 169 Justice Kavanaugh also contended that Secretary Nielsen’s
memorandum constituted “new” 170 agency action, and was therefore
permissible under the APA. 171
162. Id. at 1928.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1932 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1933 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
169. Id. at 1934 (“Under our precedents, however, the post hoc justification doctrine merely
requires that courts assess agency action based on the official explanations of the agency
decisionmakers, and not based on after-the-fact explanations advanced by agency lawyers during
litigation (or by judges).” (emphasis in original)). In this case, Secretary Nielsen made the post hoc
rationalizations in her memorandum responding to the Duke memorandum, not agency lawyers
during litigation. See id. at 1909 (majority opinion) (noting that “the problem is the timing, not the
speaker”). Justice Kavanaugh premised his argument on cases like State Farm, which noted that
“courts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency actions.” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983). In his Regents
dissent, Justice Kavanaugh implied that while post hoc rationalizations by lawyers or judges are
impermissible, such rationalizations, when made by agency officials like Secretary Nielsen, are
permissible. See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1934 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (asserting that the post hoc rationalization doctrine is “directed at reviewing
courts,” but not agencies (quoting Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir 2006))).
170. Id.
171. Id. Harkening back to the majority’s contention that DHS had to either reasonably explain
their decision or “‘deal with the problem afresh’ by taking new agency action,” id. at 1908 (majority
opinion), Justice Kavanaugh found that Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum constituted a “‘rule’
setting forth ‘an agency statement of general . . . applicability’” and thus fulfilled the ‘new “agency
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California, the Supreme Court held that the Trump Administration’s
rescission of DACA violated Section 706 of the APA because it was arbitrary
and capricious. 172 The Court found that the reasoning DHS articulated in
Secretary Nielsen’s second DACA memorandum was too attenuated from
Secretary Duke’s first DACA memorandum and that the Nielsen
memorandum “failed to consider . . . important aspect[s] of the problem.” 173
The Court briefly referenced the reliance interests at stake, but was careful to
note that such interests are “noteworthy concerns, but they are not necessarily
dispositive.” 174
The majority in Regents properly applied some required elements of
arbitrary and capricious analysis, like the need for contemporaneous
explanations and thoughtful consideration of policy alternatives, but failed to
address a crucial element of that analysis: the reliance interests at stake in
rescinding DACA. 175 Not only did Dreamers reasonably rely to their
detriment on the agency’s policy, but many other Americans did, too. 176
These interests are both tangible and intangible, and they affect the lives of
millions of people. 177 Thus, while the Court correctly concluded that the
recission of DACA was arbitrary and capricious, 178 the Court incorrectly
dismissed the serious reliance interests induced by the program as not
dispositive. 179

action’ requirement for rescinding DACA. Id. at 1933 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)).
172. Id. at 1910 (majority opinion).
173. Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Secretary Nielsen’s reasoning only supported a partial
recission of DACA and failed to address viable alternative policies. Id. at 1912–13.
174. Id. at 1914.
175. See infra Section IV.B.
176. Id.
177. Id. Tangible interests include purchasing homes and starting businesses, and intangible
interests include cultivating diverse communities and protection from deportation. See infra Section
IV.B (addressing the importance of reliance interests in APA arbitrary and capricious analysis and
detailing the reliance interests of Dreamers and other Americans based on the existence of the
DACA program).
178. See infra Section IV.A.
179. See infra Section IV.B.
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A. The Court Properly Held that the Rescission of DACA was Arbitrary
and Capricious.
The APA requires agencies’ decision-making to be “reasoned” 180 and
requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” decisions that are “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.” 181 Here, the Court properly held that DACA’s recission was arbitrary
and capricious. 182 The reasons Secretary Nielsen provided in her
memorandum did not derive from those provided in Secretary Duke’s initial
memorandum, 183 and DHS ignored potential alternatives to recission. 184
Moreover, the rescission appeared to be an attempt to indulge President
Trump and implement his anti-immigrant agenda. 185 Policies that intimately
affect hundreds of thousands of lives 186 cannot—and should not—be
180. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015) (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc.
v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
181. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In their review, courts are limited to
“the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action.” Michigan, 576 U.S. at 758.
Additionally, courts must determine whether agencies considered alternatives to their proposed
policies that are “within the ambit of the existing” policy. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983); see supra Section II.B.
182. See supra Section II.C.1.
183. See infra Section IV.A.1.
184. See infra Section IV.A.2.
185. For examples of how the Trump Administration’s policies were both blatantly and subtly
anti-immigrant, see Mónica Verea, Anti-Immigrant and Anti-Mexican Attitudes and Policies during
the First 18 Months of the Trump Administration, 13 NORTEAMÉRICA 197 (2018); Ted Hesson &
Chris Kahn, Trump Pushes Anti-immigrant Message Even as Coronavirus Dominates Campaign,
REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2020, 6:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-immigrationinsight/trump-pushes-anti-immigrant-message-even-as-coronavirus-dominates-campaignidUSKCN25A18W; Michael D. Shear & Miriam Jordan, Undoing Trump’s Anti-Immigrant
Policies Will Mean Looking at the Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/us/politics/trump-biden-us-immigration-system.html;
Michael D. Shear & Emily Cochrane, Trump Says Administration Will Try Again to End ‘Dreamers’
Program, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/us/politics/trumpdaca.html; Stuart Anderson, A Review of Trump Immigration Policy, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2020, 2:01
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2020/08/26/fact-check-and-review-of-trumpimmigration-policy/?sh=1cbfcee556c0; Leila Schochet, Trump’s Immigration Policies Are
Harming American Children, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 31, 2017, 9:01 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/early-childhood/reports/2017/07/31/436377/trumpsimmigration-policies-harming-american-children/; Peniel Ibe, Trump’s Attacks on the Legal
Immigration System Explained, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://www.afsc.org/blogs/news-and-commentary/trumps-attacks-legal-immigration-systemexplained.
186. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901 (2020).
“Hundreds of thousands” is an extremely conservative estimate: DACA affects the lives of its
recipients, but it also affects the rest of the American population. DACA Facts: The Case for
Protecting Dreamers, FWD.US (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.fwd.us/news/daca-facts/. DACA
recipients contribute more than $42 billion to the country’s annual gross domestic product. Id.
Dreamers also pay billions in taxes every year. Id. More important than economics, Dreamers add
value to American society: they work and attend schools, launch their own businesses, and enrich
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rescinded by unelected agency leaders 187 for their own political gain. 188
Because both the stated and unstated reasons for DACA’s rescission were
problematic, the Court correctly considered the attempted rescission arbitrary
and capricious. 189
1. The Court Correctly Determined that DHS Failed to Articulate
Acceptable Reasons for Rescission.
The Court correctly decided that DHS’s inadequate reasoning failed
under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. 190 Chief Justice Roberts
noted that when an agency chooses to elaborate on its initial explanation of
the agency action instead of taking new action with new reasoning, courts
must review the explanations “critically.” 191 As discussed above, the Trump
Administration initially attempted to rescind DACA through the Duke
memorandum in September of 2017. 192 The Duke memorandum provided a
bare-bones explanation for rescission that rested almost entirely on thenAttorney General Jeff Sessions’s determination that DACA was illegal. 193
The Duke memorandum contained no reference to the reasonable reliance
interests of DACA recipients and no evidence that DHS had considered

communities with diverse cultures and perspectives. Id.; Joe McCarthy, 5 Ways Immigration
Actually Enhances a Country’s Culture, GLOB. CITIZEN (July 18, 2018),
https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/how-immigrants-benefit-society-trump/; see also infra
notes 267–269 and accompanying text.
187. Even President Trump recognizes the dangers of “unaccountable,” unelected leaders
dictating the law. Eric Katz, Trump Signs Orders to Restrict ‘Unaccountable Bureaucrats’ from
EXEC.
(Oct.
9,
2019),
Creating
Backdoor
Regulations,
GOV’T
https://www.govexec.com/management/2019/10/trump-signs-orders-restrict-unaccountablebureaucrats-creating-backdoor-regulations/160493/.
188. It is clear that Secretaries Duke and Nielsen attempted to rescind the program for their own
political gain because they could not––and did not––articulate valid reasons for the rescission. See
infra Section IV.A.1. Rather, the Secretaries bowed to political pressure from the Trump
Administration and cited surface-level, insufficient reasons. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Julie
Hirschfeld & Adam Liptak, How the Trump Administration Eroded Its Own Legal Case on DACA,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/us/politics/supreme-courtdreamers-case.html; see also infra notes 212–220 and accompanying text.
189. See infra Sections IV.A.1 and IV.A.2.
190. See infra notes 191–234 and accompanying text.
191. See generally Fifth Amendment – Due Process Clause – Equal Protection – Department of
Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, 134 HARV. L. REV. 510, 513 (2020)
(quoting Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1908) (noting the emphasis Chief Justice Roberts places on the level
of scrutiny used in reviewing agency action).
192. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
193. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1908. The Duke memorandum also mentioned the ongoing litigation
around DAPA as a reason to rescind DACA. It assumed but did not explain that the legal
foundations of DAPA and DACA were the same, thus if one fell so should the other. See Duke
Memo, supra note 47.
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alternatives to the program, despite allegedly “[r]ecognizing the complexities
associated with winding down the program.” 194
By failing to meaningfully address anything other than the Attorney
General’s illegality determination and the ongoing DAPA litigation, DHS
“failed to consider . . . important aspect[s] of the problem.” 195 Secretary
Duke’s memorandum, while discussing both DACA and DAPA, did not
distinguish between the programs despite their marked differences. 196 Under
the DACA program, about 700,000 noncitizens who entered the United
States illegally as children received a renewable two-year forbearance of
removal (deferred action), work authorization, and access to related federal
benefits. 197 The DAPA program would have conferred the same forbearance,
work authorization, and associated benefits to more than 4.3 million
noncitizens—more than six times the number of noncitizens benefitting from
DACA—whose children were United States citizens or lawful permanent
residents. 198
The obvious difference between the programs is the circumstances of
the qualifying individuals.199 Dreamers “know only this country as home.” 200
The only individuals who could qualify for DACA’s protections were those
who (1) were under the age of thirty-one in 2012; (2) lived in the United
States continuously since 2007; (3) were current students, high school
graduates, or honorably discharged veterans; (4) had never been convicted of
a serious crime; and (5) did not threaten national security or public safety. 201
DACA’s protections applied to a much smaller subsection of the population
than DAPA, whose protections extended to those who (1) were parents of
194. Duke Memo, supra note 47; Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1908.
195. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). The
Court relied heavily on State Farm in its analysis. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912. In State Farm, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) promulgated a regulation that
required automobiles manufactured after 1982 to be equipped with passive restraints, either
automatic seatbelts or airbags. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 37–38. Prior to the regulation going into
effect, NHTSA decided that automatic seatbelts were not sufficiently protective and proceeded to
rescind the regulation in full even though airbags were still considered to be sufficiently protective.
Id. at 38. The Court concluded that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious because NHTSA did
not consider implementing an airbag-only policy and failed to explain its rationale for not doing so.
Id. at 51.
196. Duke Memo, supra note 47; see also Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Memorandum from Secretary
OF
HOMELAND
SEC.
(June
22,
2018),
Kirstjen
M.
Nielsen,
DEP’T
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0622_S1_Memorandum_DACA.pdf
[hereinafter Nielsen Memo] (dismissing distinctions between DAPA and DACA by stating “[a]ny
arguable distinctions between the DAPA and DACA policies are not sufficiently material to
convince me that the DACA policy is lawful.”).
197. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901.
198. Id. at 1902–03.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1912 (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. Id. at 1901.
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United States citizens or lawful permanent residents as of November of 2014;
(2) continuously lived in the United States since before 2010; (3) were
physically present in the United States on November 20, 2014; (4) had no
lawful immigration status; (5) did not fall within DHS’s enforcement
priorities; and (6) “present[ed] no other factors that, in the exercise of
discretion, ma[de] [ ] the grant of deferred action inappropriate.” 202 By
failing to address the significant differences between DACA and DAPA, and
assigning the perceived problems with DAPA to DACA, Secretary Duke did
not provide adequate reasons for DACA’s rescission.203 The decision-firstexplanation-later approach will render this type of agency action arbitrary
and capricious, as it necessitates impermissible post hoc rationalizations.204
The Nielsen memorandum, too, failed to provide adequate reasons for
DACA’s rescission. 205 Secretary Nielsen could have defended Secretary
Duke’s DACA rescission in two ways: she could have (1) elaborated on
Secretary Duke’s reasoning or (2) taken new agency action premised on new
or additional reasons that were not present in the Duke memorandum. 206
Secretary Nielsen chose not to take new agency action; so, to justify the
rescission, she was required to elaborate on Secretary Duke’s reasoning. 207
She did not; instead, Secretary Nielsen chose to present three new,
“meaningfully distinct” reasons for DACA’s rescission. 208
Secretary Nielsen’s first reason did address the heart of the Duke
memorandum—the Attorney General’s determination that DACA was
illegally implemented—but it merely repeated Secretary Duke’s analysis
rather than elaborating on it. 209 The Court has reiterated time after time that
202. John F. Kelly, Rescission of Memorandum Providing for Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”), DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (June 15,
2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/15/rescission-memorandum-providing-deferred-actionparents-americans-and-lawful.
203. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1911–12.
204. See id. at 135 (highlighting the arbitrariness of decisions not stemming from agency
expertise). In certain instances, this type of approach may be justified, for example when agencies
wait until after notice-and-comment periods to explain the rationale behind their policy choices.
Christopher J. Walker, What the DACA Rescission Case Means for Administrative Law: A New
Frontier for Chenery I’s Ordinary Remand Rule, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 19,
2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/what-the-daca-rescission-case-means-for-administrative-lawa-new-frontier-for-chenery-is-ordinary-remand-rule/. DHS did not provide a notice-and-comment
period when it rescinded DACA. Gabriella D’Agostini, No Status, No Notice, No Comment: The
Lack of Procedural Adherence to the APA Notice and Comment Requirement Concerning
Immigration Rules, MICH. J. ENV’T ADMIN. L. BLOG (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.mjealonline.org/no-status-no-notice-no-comment-the-lack-of-procedural-adherence-to-the-apa-noticeand-comment-requirement-concerning-immigration-rules/.
205. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1908–09.
206. Id. at 1908.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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when an agency seeks to elaborate on the reasons for its implementation of
or change in a policy, it must rely on and better explain the initial reasons it
presented when first attempting the action. 210 Secretary Nielsen’s second and
third reasons, which were maintaining public confidence in the rule of law
and various policy reasons, including a preference for legislative fixes, were
never mentioned in the Duke memorandum. 211
While the Regents majority did not address this point, one wonders
whether the lack of consistent, reasoned analysis in the memoranda
demonstrates the “foregone conclusion” of the DACA rescission. 212
Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum purporting to fix the flaws in the Duke
memorandum was a “boldly and blatantly results-oriented” 213 attempt to
dismantle a program politically unpopular for her appointer, President
Trump. Secretaries Duke and Nielsen served as “rubber stamp[s]” 214 for
President Trump’s immigration priorities, 215 effectively disregarding their
APA-imposed duty to provide reasonably explained decisions with
legitimate motivations.216 The timelines of the Secretaries’ employment is
illustrative. 217 While the Secretaries executed policy priorities that President
210. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 417 (1971); Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 760 (2015). Better explaining their initial
reasoning ensures that agencies cannot “conceal the real motivations and considerations behind the
administrative policies.” Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary
Executive, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 564 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Court
defended the tradition of agency transparency, which furthers the democratic process by allowing
the public to accurately assess its government. Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out)
Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31 YALE. L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 80 (2012).
Agency transparency is especially important because agency leaders are unelected officials who
cannot be held accountable by the people through the democratic process the way that elected
leaders can. Michael Halberstam, Beyond Transparency: Rethinking Election Reform from an Open
Government Perspective, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1007, 1007–08 (2015). For government to be truly
representative, citizens must have insight into the actual motivations of agencies. Id.
211. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1908.
212. Jonathan Blitzer, The Trump Administration’s Plot to End DACA Faces a Supreme Court
Test, NEW YORKER (Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-trumpadministrations-plot-to-end-daca-faces-a-supreme-court-test.
213. R. Parker Sheffy & Geoffrey A. Hoffman, Appellate Exceptionalism? The Troubling Case
of Immigration Decisions’ Continued Precedential Effect Even After Circuit Court Vacatur, 2020
U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 129, 135 (“Decisions which are not the result of agency expertise but are
rather boldly and blatantly results-oriented are similarly likely arbitrary and capricious. The
Supreme Court’s recent decision finding the government’s attempted rescission of the DACA
Program to be arbitrary and capricious is an excellent example.”). The authors also note that
“unfairness and injustice” result from this kind of approach. Id. at 138.
214. Blitzer, supra note 212.
215. One of the Trump Administration’s stated immigration priorities was rescinding DACA.
See Michael D. Shear & Emily Cochrane, supra note 185.
216. See supra Section II.C.
217. See Nick Miroff, Top Homeland Security Official, Who Clashed with White House Over
Immigration Policy, to Step Down, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2018, 6:18 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/top-homeland-security-official-who-
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Trump liked, they were safe in their positions. 218 However, as soon as the
Secretaries executed a policy that he did not like, they were forced to
resign. 219 Secretaries Duke and Nielsen knew that if they wanted to maintain
their positions they had to appease the President, so that is what they did. 220
Because the Nielsen memorandum could be construed as a political ploy that
failed to elaborate on the Duke memorandum’s only stated reason and
asserted new reasons not provided by Secretary Duke, the Court correctly
determined that the Nielsen memorandum was an impermissible “post hoc
rationalization[]” 221 in violation of the APA. 222
Moreover, the Regents majority found that neither the Duke
memorandum nor the Nielsen memorandum contained reasoning that
considered the reasonable, legitimate reliance interests223 induced by the
DACA program. 224 Where an affected party relied on an agency’s prior
policy, the agency is required to explain why its interest outweighs the party’s

clashed-with-white-house-over-immigration-policy-to-step-down/2018/02/23/c3659d66-18e411e8-942d-16a950029788_story.html (providing the timeline of Secretary Duke’s employment);
Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Maggie Haberman, Michael D. Shear, & Eric Schmitt, Kirstjen Nielsen
Resigns as Trump’s Homeland Security Secretary, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/07/us/politics/kirstjen-nielsen-dhs-resigns.html (providing the
timeline of Secretary Nielsen’s employment).
218. Id.
219. Id. Secretary Duke refused to end the Temporary Protected Status program, which protects
thousands of immigrants fleeing violence or disasters. Miroff, supra note 217. Secretary Nielsen
refused to block all immigrants from seeking asylum. Kanno-Youngs, Haberman, Shear, & Schmitt,
supra note 217. After these refusals, President Trump pushed the Secretaries out of their positions.
Id.
220. See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson & Ron Nixon, Kirstjen Nielsen Was a Target of Trump’s
Immigration Ire. Now She’s His Protector., N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/us/politics/nielsen-trump-immigration-protector.html
(detailing how Secretary Nielsen shielded former President Trump from criticism after politically
damaging news of the Administration’s family separation policy broke).
221. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971) (citing Burlington
Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168–69 (1962)) (observing that post hoc rationalizations
“have traditionally been found to be an inadequate basis for review”). The Court noted that agency
action is arbitrary and capricious where “the decision was [not] based on a consideration of [all]
relevant factors.” Id. at 416.
222. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 104 S. Ct. 1891, 1909 (2020).
223. See supra note 186 and accompanying text; see also infra Section IV.B.
224. Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 1913–14. Reliance interests are some of the “relevant factors”
discussed in the Court’s decision in Overton Park. 401 U.S. at 416; see also United States v. Pa.
Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674–75 (1973) (remanding the case to determine whether the
company reasonably relied on the agency’s original interpretation of its regulation). Without that
determination, the Court could not consider all of the relevant factors and therefore could not
determine whether the agency action was arbitrary or capricious. Id. Although the court recognized
that DHS had not weighed the reliance interests in its reasoning, it also chose not to weigh those
interests. See infra Section IV.B for a more detailed discussion of the reliance interests at issue and
the Court’s responsibility to weigh them.
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interest. 225 DHS argued that Secretaries Duke and Nielsen were not required
to address any alleged reliance interests because DACA “conferred no
substantive rights.” 226 While it may not have conferred substantive rights, it
did confer substantive benefits that warrant reliance interest analysis. 227 Not
only were Dreamers provided specific government-sponsored benefits in
two-year increments, 228 but Dreamers also received tangential benefits that
were dependent upon DACA’s promises. 229
The Court noted that even if it took DHS’s argument that DACA
recipients had no reasonable reliance interests at face value, the agency was
required at least to address that contention in its rescission to comply with
the APA. 230 DHS did not articulate acceptable reasoning in either
memorandum. 231 In its first memorandum the reasoning rested solely on the
Attorney General’s determination and did not take into account reliance
interests. 232 In its second memorandum DHS did not articulate acceptable
reasoning because it failed to elaborate on the agency’s original reason and
These “omission[s] alone
did not address reliance interests. 233
render[] . . . [the] decision arbitrary and capricious.” 234
2. The Court Correctly Determined that DHS Failed to Consider
Viable Policy Alternatives.
The Court also correctly used the APA’s arbitrary and capricious
standard to analyze the issue of DHS’s failure to consider reasonable policy
alternatives. 235 In State Farm, the Court made clear what it alluded to in
Overton Park: agency decisions are not “unimpeachable.” 236 Agencies are
required to at least consider “feasible and prudent alternative[s]” before
enacting contemplated changes. 237 This consideration helps maintain the
225. Cf. John Gedid, Administrative Procedure for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction
to the 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 241, 276 (2012)
(analyzing the 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act in the context of the Administrative
Procedure Act).
226. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1913 (quoting Application to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (No.18-587), p. 125a).
227. Id.
228. Id. The government-sponsored benefits include, but are not limited to, Social Security
numbers and Medicare eligibility. Id. at 1902.
229. See, e.g., supra note 177; see also infra Section IV.B.
230. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1913–14.
231. Id. at 1908–14.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1913.
235. See infra notes 236–253 and accompanying text.
236. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983).
237. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 408 (1971).
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status quo, which mitigates the risk of upsetting reasonable reliance
interests. 238 It is especially important in the context of DACA because of
Dreamers’ serious reliance on the policy. 239
In the first DACA rescission memorandum, Secretary Duke made no
attempt to explain why DACA’s forbearance policy could not be divorced
from benefits eligibility. 240 When making his illegality determination,
Attorney General Sessions focused only on the conferral of benefits. 241 He
“neither addressed the forbearance policy at the heart of DACA nor
compelled DHS to abandon that policy.” 242 Although Secretary Duke was
left with the option to remove benefits eligibility while leaving the
forbearance policy untouched, she declined to consider this option. 243 In the
second DACA rescission memorandum, Secretary Nielsen also made no
attempt to explain why the program’s forbearance and benefits policies could
not be separated. 244
The ability to separate the forbearance and benefits policies in DACA
was critical in the Court’s determination because, according to the
government, the benefits component of the program was what made DACA
illegal. 245 While the APA does not require agencies to consider all policy
alternatives, 246 DHS was required to consider the efficacy of a forbearanceonly policy because it was “within the ambit of the existing” policy. 247

238. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009) (noting the
importance of the status quo when assessing industry reliance); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (emphasizing the importance of consistency
and noting that “unexplained inconsistency is . . . a reason for holding an [agency] interpretation to
be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice”).
239. See supra note 186 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 265, 267–270 and
accompanying text.
240. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912–13; Duke Memo, supra note 47 (failing to mention forbearance
and addressing only benefits).
241. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912.
242. Id.
243. Id. Given DHS’s supposed familiarity with proper APA policy, it is unclear why Secretary
Duke declined to consider removing benefits while maintaining forbearance. Id. One explanation
could be pressure from the Trump Administration to end the policy, no matter the manner. See
Blitzer, supra note 212 (explaining how Trump’s DHS served as a “rubber stamp” for his policies).
244. Id. at 1908–09; Nielsen Memo, supra note 196. Secretary Nielsen’s enthusiasm to end the
program could come from the same motivation as Secretary Duke’s: appeasing the president. See
supra note 220.
245. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912–13. The government could have precluded Dreamers from
accessing the benefits while maintaining the forbearance policy. Id. To do that, the government
could have amended the regulations codified in the Code of Federal Regulations that conferred the
substantive benefits to individuals subject to deferred action. Id. DHS, according to its own
reasoning, did not even consider this course of action. Id. at 1903–04.
246. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51.
247. Id.
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DACA has two components: deferred action and benefits eligibility. 248 The
heart of DACA, however, is its deferred action, or forbearance, policy. 249
Forbearance is not just within the ambit of the policy, rather it is the policy. 250
By relying on problems that applied to only one part of the policy as sufficient
to rescind the policy in its entirety, 251 Secretary Duke “failed to supply the
requisite ‘reasoned analysis.’” 252 Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum, replete
with the same flaws, could not make up for Secretary Duke’s deficiency. 253
B. The Court Improperly Dismissed the Reliance Interests at Stake in
the Rescission.
While the Court was correct in determining that the rescission of DACA
was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the APA for lack of
reasoned analysis, it was incorrect in diminishing the reliance interests at
stake in this case as not significant enough to strike the rescission on their
own. 254 Both agencies and courts are required to consider reliance interests
in arbitrary and capricious analyses. 255 Although the Court went so far as to
note that failure to address reliance interests “would be arbitrary or
capricious,” 256 the Court also stated that jeopardizing these legitimate
reliance interests was “not necessarily dispositive” of the rescission’s
arbitrariness or capriciousness. 257 Where agencies and courts fail to consider
reliance interests—even interests seemingly less significant than the ones at
stake in the DACA rescission 258—not only do the agencies make decisions
that are arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the APA, but the
courts decide cases in problematic and harmful ways. 259
The Supreme Court has considered significant the reliance interests of
various industries. 260 In each case where the Court weighed industry reliance

248. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51 (requiring agencies to consider policies in their entirety
before making changes to them).
252. Id. at 57 (quoting Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C.
Cir.1970)).
253. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1916.
254. See infra notes 255–300 and accompanying text.
255. See supra Section II.C.1.a.
256. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).
257. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1914.
258. See NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d. 209, 240 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting that “[t]he Supreme
Court has set aside changes in agency policy for failure to consider reliance interests that pale in
comparison to the ones at stake [in DACA].”).
259. See supra Section II.C.1.a.
260. See supra notes 112–116 and accompanying text.
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interests, the Court looked to their pecuniary interests. 261 Here, while not
industry-specific, there are substantial pecuniary interests at stake that the
Court should have considered: DACA recipients’ own financial interests and
the financial interests of the country as a whole. 262 The pecuniary reliance
interests at stake in the Court’s prior cases may have been very important,
but none of them dealt with the individual lives, livelihoods, and liberties 263
of more than 700,000 people. 264 DACA recipients made major life decisions
based on the expected protections of the DACA program, including divulging
their undocumented status to the government. 265
In NAACP v. Trump, 266 the District Court for the District of Columbia
noted that the more than 700,000 DACA recipients’ reliance interests
included not only educational interests, 267 employment interests, 268 and

261. See Blake Emerson, The Claims of Official Reason: Administrative Guidance on Social
Inclusion, 128 YALE L.J. 2122, 2137 (2019) (noting that “reliance interests may be pecuniary” but
“may also include nonpecuniary expectations”).
262. Courtney Vinopal, What ending DACA could cost the U.S. Economy, PBS (Nov. 12, 2019,
5:50 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/what-ending-daca-could-costthe-u-s-economy (explaining how DACA’s rescission would impact Dreamers as well as every part
of the American economy).
263. Liberties were at stake insofar as Dreamers were required to provide detailed information
about their lives to the government, which, in the absence of DACA, would make them deportable.
See infra note 265.
264. All of the interests referenced in notes 112–116 are simply pecuniary industry interests,
whereas DACA involves pecuniary and individualized interests. See NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d. at
240 (“DACA had been in place for five years and had engendered the reliance of hundreds of
thousands of beneficiaries, many of whom had structured their education, employment, and other
life activities on the assumption that they would be able to renew their DACA benefits.”).
265. Brief for Regents, supra note 25, at 6–7; Brief for Alianza Americas, supra note 25, at 7–8.
Revealing undocumented status to the government exemplifies the significance of Dreamers’
reliance on DHS’s policy. Brief for Alianza Americas, supra note 25, at 13. To apply for DACA,
Dreamers are required to disclose biographical information, information about their entry into the
United States, and current and former addresses. Id. This disclosure is significant because the
information required for DACA is the same information that ICE, a part of DHS, uses to find and
detain undocumented individuals. See New Documents Reveal ICE Access to DACA Recipients’
Information, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Apr. 21 ,2020), https://www.nilc.org/2020/04/21/newdocuments-reveal-ice-access-to-daca-recipients-information/ (noting the danger to DACA
recipients of allowing ICE access to their personal identifying information).
266. 298 F. Supp. 3d. 209 (D.D.C. 2018).
267. Educational interests include earning advanced degrees, participating in postgraduate
research and studies, and accessing student loans, among others. Id. at 240 n.24; see also Brief for
Alianza Americas, supra note 25, at 5.
268. Employment opportunities are related to the provision in DACA that allows recipients to
obtain work authorization. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891,
1902 (2020).
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financial interests, 269 but also personal interests like starting families. 270
Dreamers have invested millions of dollars into the American economy
through their purchase of assets like homes and cars. 271 More than 43,000
Dreamers have started their own businesses. 272 DACA recipients have also
invested heavily in education and job training programs with the expectation
that they would be able to work in the country legally while their removal
was deferred. 273 Losing their DACA status would mean that Dreamers would
lose access to the investments they have made in themselves because they
would lose their work authorization, or worse, be deported. 274
While standing alone these interests are significant enough to warrant
an arbitrary and capricious determination, DACA recipients’ interests are not
the only ones at stake: employers, schools, families, and communities all
have interests in DACA’s continued existence. 275 Of the more than 700,000
current Dreamers, ninety three percent are either working or in school. 276
Some 202,500 Dreamers work in jobs classified as “essential” during the
COVID-19 pandemic, including more than 29,000 frontline healthcare
workers. 277 Around eighty one percent of DACA recipients have graduated
high school and taken at least one higher education course. 278 Thousands of
DACA recipients are still involved in higher learning, either as educators or

269. DACA recipients relied on the program’s protections to make financial decisions like
opening bank accounts, buying houses, and starting businesses. See Brief for Regents, supra note
25, at 40–43; Brief for Alianza Americas, supra note 25, at 1–2, 15.
270. NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d. at 240. Note that DACA recipients and their families total more
than 1 million people. Blitzer, supra note 212.
271. Parija Kavilanz, For Dreamers, DACA’s End Could Mean Losing Their Homes, CNN (Jan.
24, 2018, 10:45 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/24/news/economy/daca-dreamershomeowners/index.html.
272. Vinopal, supra note 262.
273. Id.; Claudia Flores & Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, Why DACA Matters, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS
(Apr.
29,
2021,
9:01
AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2021/04/29/498944/why-dacamatters/.
274. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1902 (2020)
(noting that work authorization was a benefit Dreamers received only as part of the DACA
program); Brief for Alianza Americas, supra note 25, at 19 (noting that temporary protection from
deportation was a protection Dreamers received only as part of the DACA program).
275. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1914. The Court even notes that Dreamers’ families include more
than 200,000 United States citizen children. Id.
276. Vinopal, supra note 262.
277. Amy Sherman, How Many DACA Recipients Are Essential Workers Amid COVID-19
(Feb.
9,
2021),
Pandemic?,
POLITIFACT
https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2021/feb/09/richard-durbin/how-many-daca-recipients-areessential-workers-ami/.
278. Vinopal, supra note 262.
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researchers. 279 Additionally, more than 1.5 million people currently live with
a DACA recipient, including 254,000 United States citizen children. 280
The government itself would also be harmed if DACA were
rescinded. 281 Not only would the government lose out on billions of dollars
in taxes each year, 282 but it would also see a dip in Social Security and
Medicare funds. 283 Dreamers also contribute more than $42 billion annually
to America’s gross domestic product. 284 The impact of DACA’s rescission
would “radiate outward” to every aspect of American society. 285 With the
“serious,” life-altering significance of these interests, the Court should have
found the Dreamers’ reliance interests alone to be “dispositive” of the
arbitrariness and capriciousness of DHS’s recission, not just “one factor to
consider.” 286 Properly analyzing agency action under the APA means
analyzing the reliance interests of DACA recipients. 287 Given the APA’s
requirements and the magnitude of the reliance interests at stake in the
program, it is unlikely the DACA policy could ever be reasonably rescinded
within the parameters of the APA. 288

279. Brief for National Education Association, supra note 25, at 16–18.
280. Prchal Svajlenka & Wolgin, supra note 29.
281. Supra note 29.
282. Dreamers pay $8.7 billion in federal, state, and local taxes each year. Prchal Svajlenka &
Wolgin, supra note 29.
283. Flores & Prchal Svajlenka, supra note 273.
284. Vinopal, supra note 262.
285. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1914 (quoting Brief for Regents, supra note 25, at 41–42 (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
286. Id.
287. See supra Section II.C.1.a (discussing agencies’ and courts’ obligations to weigh reliance
interests).
288. But see Maria Sacchetti & Amy B Wang, U.S. Judge Blocks New Applicants to Program
that Protects Undocumented ‘Dreamers’ Who Arrived as Children, WASH. POST (July 17, 2021,
10:56
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/daca-courtdecision/2021/07/16/6c9a35be-e677-11eb-a41e-c8442c213fa8_story.html. On July 17, 2021, a
federal judge in Texas issued a permanent injunction vacating the DACA memorandum stating that
the memorandum was “illegally implemented” and that “the public interest of the nation is always
served by the cessation of a program that was created in violation of law.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted). He defended his order as “reasonable” and purported to weigh the competing interests of
Dreamers and the states challenging the program. Id. He determined that “[h]undreds of thousands
of individual DACA recipients, along with their employers, states, and loved ones, have come to
rely on the DACA program,” but decided that states’ interests in limiting noncitizens’ competition
with Americans for local jobs was more important. Id. He recognized that “it is not equitable for a
government program that has engendered such a significant reliance to terminate suddenly,” but
still enjoined all administration of the DACA program effective immediately. Id. Although the
judge asserted his consideration of reliance interests, his determination that the states’ pecuniary
interests outweighed all others runs contrary to Supreme Court caselaw, especially considering the
pecuniary an liberty interests of Dreamers and the rest of the country.
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Moreover, the Court appears to contradict itself when discussing
whether DHS was required to weigh the reliance interests at all.289 The Court
explicitly notes that “DHS was not required” to weigh the reliance interests,
then later in the same paragraph states that DHS “was required to assess
whether there were reliance interests, determine whether they were
significant, and weigh any such interests against competing policy
concerns.” 290 This apparent contradiction in whether DHS was required to
weigh reliance interests indicates that the Court improperly weighed their
importance, especially considering the massive impact of recission on DACA
recipients and the country as a whole. 291 Although the Court notes that
“hardship to DACA recipients” should be considered, the Court ultimately
rests its decision exclusively on the agency’s failure to provide a reasoned
analysis. 292
This improper weighing could also be viewed as the Court avoiding its
responsibility to address the merits of the respondents’ claims. Here, both
DHS and the Court were required to at least consider DACA recipients’
The Court—despite its holdings in Encino
reliance interests. 293
Motorcars, 294 Fox Television Stations, 295 and Smiley 296—skirted the issue of
weighing reliance interests altogether by punting the responsibility of
weighing these interests back to DHS alone.297 In other cases where
significant reliance interests were at stake, 298 the Court addressed these
concerns, weighed them, and then based on that analysis determined whether
the agency action was valid. 299 By refusing to address the merits of the
rescissions and focusing only on Secretary Duke’s reasoning, the Court left
open the possibility for DHS to rescind DACA at a later date despite
Dreamers’ serious, reasonable reliance on the program. 300 Thus, the Court
did just what it chastised DHS for: failed to address the reliance issues at
stake.

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id. at 1914–15.
See supra notes 265, 267–270 and accompanying text.
Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1916.
See supra Section II.C.1.a.
See supra note 113.
See supra note 107.
See supra note 116.
Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1914.
See supra notes 112–116.
Id.
Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1914.

2021]

DISINTEREST IN RELIANCE INTERESTS

145

V. CONCLUSION
In Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California, the Supreme Court held that DHS’s attempted rescission of
DACA was arbitrary and capricious in violation of Section 706 of the
APA. 301 The Court correctly determined that the flawed reasoning in the
Duke and Nielsen memoranda rendered the rescission arbitrary and
capricious, but incorrectly dismissed Dreamers’ reliance interests. 302 Failing
to articulate adequate reasons for agency action will render agency action
arbitrary and capricious, 303 but so too will failing to address legitimate
reliance interests. 304 In dismissing the many reliance interests at stake in the
program’s rescission as not “dispositive” 305 of arbitrariness or
capriciousness, the Court incorrectly applied the analysis required by Section
706 of the APA. 306 DHS’s failure to weigh the serious reliance interests of
both Dreamers and the country as a whole could have alone rendered the
rescission arbitrary and capricious. 307 Hundreds of thousands of Dreamers
like Abigail built their lives on the promises of DACA and enriched their
communities in the process. 308 The APA mandates that their reliance be
taken into account. 309

301. Id. at 1915.
302. See supra Section IV.
303. See supra Section II.C.1.
304. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); see also supra notes 110–
116 and accompanying text.
305. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1914.
306. See supra Section IV.B.
307. Id.
308. See supra note 29; see also supra notes 265, 267–270 and accompanying text.
309. See supra Section II.C.1; see also supra notes 112–116 and accompanying text.

